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THE COURT LOSES ITS WAY WITH THE GLOBAL
POSITIONING SYSTEM: UNITED STATES V. JONES
RETREATS TO THE “CLASSIC TRESPASSORY SEARCH”
George M. Dery III*
Ryan Evaro**
This Article analyzes United States v. Jones, in which the Supreme Court
considered whether government placement of a global positioning system (GPS)
device on a vehicle to follow a person’s movements constituted a Fourth Amend-
ment “search.” The Jones Court ruled that two distinct definitions existed for a
Fourth Amendment “search.” In addition to Katz v. United States’s reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy standard, which the Court had used exclusively for over four
decades, the Court recognized a second kind of search that it called a “classic
trespassory search.” The second kind of search occurrs when officials physically
trespass or intrude upon a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain informa-
tion. This work examines the concerns created by Jones’s ruling. This Article
asserts that, by emphasizing property rights in bringing back the decades-old physi-
cal trespass test, Jones potentially undermined the Katz standard. Further, Jones
added an inquiry into motivation by asking if the government committed the intru-
sion to obtain information, thus creating a subjective inquiry that is inconsistent
with much of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Finally, in its attempt to distinguish
its facts from earlier vehicle-tracking cases, the Court created a loophole in Fourth
Amendment application that law enforcement could exploit in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
If you learned that the federal government had attached a Global-
Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to the undercarriage of your car
and monitored your every movement for a twenty-eight-day period, col-
lecting more than two thousand pages of data that tracked your vehicle at
all times to within fifty to one hundred feet of its location,1 what would
trouble you the most about this intrusion? Would it be the prospect of a
government, formed for the purpose of protecting your rights, following
you about as you travel wherever your private whim takes you, without
your having even been aware of its presence? Would the concern be that
Big Brother, employing its vast resources, including multiple satellites, has
targeted you to watch and record your every move? Or would the idea that
bothered you the most be that agents physically trespassed on your prop-
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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erty by sticking a GPS device onto the mud-splattered undercarriage of
your car?2
The Supreme Court was confronted with these concerns in United
States v. Jones, a case in which a joint Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Metropolitan Police Department task force investigating narcotics traffick-
ing placed a GPS device on Antoine Jones’s Jeep and followed it for so
long that the GPS’s battery had to be replaced.3 Rather than facing the
“vexing problem” of whether such a four-week investigation was too long
or intrusive, the Court in Jones chose to focus on the fact that the “Gov-
ernment physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.”4 In doing so, the Court purposely pointed to the past,
proudly following a 1765 case known as a “monument of English free-
dom.”5 By anchoring its reasoning to the eighteenth century, Jones missed
an opportunity to provide Constitutional guidance for technological intru-
sions of the twenty-first century. More specifically, by narrowing its in-
quiry to physical intrusions on private property, the Court failed to address
the larger concerns of blanket and surreptitious government surveillance in
public places.
This Article begins, in Part I, with a historical review of the Court’s
definition of a Fourth Amendment “search.”6 Part II presents Jones: its
factual background as well as the Court’s opinion. Part III then explores
the implications of the Jones decision. This work examines whether Jones’s
resurrection of the decades-old physical trespass test will undermine the
Katz privacy expectation definition that has been the standard for nearly a
half-century. Also considered is whether Jones’s novel addition of a subjec-
tive element to the definition of a search can be reconciled with the rest of
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 949.
5. Id. The case the Jones Court cited was Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B.); 2 Wils. K.B. 275, an authority which “is a case we have described as a ‘monument of
English freedom’ undoubtedly familiar to ‘every American statesman at the time the Constitu-
tion was adopted.’” Id. Entick, of course, was decided centuries before the advent of GPS
technology.
6. Included in this review is an exploration of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
standard developed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) and consistently applied by
the Court for decades. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
116 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 19:113
Fourth Amendment doctrine.7 Finally, this Article will assess whether, in
distinguishing its facts from earlier vehicle-tracking cases, Jones unwittingly
created a loophole to Fourth Amendment application that authorities
might exploit. This Article endeavors to develop two key themes: (1) in
trying to cope with the challenges that technology will create in the fu-
ture, the Court confined itself to narrow doctrines of the past, and (2) in
defining the privacy right protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court
clung to a focus on the visible and tangible, thus missing an opportunity to
address the entire range of privacy concerns implicated by today’s ever-
increasing intrusions on the individual.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A review of the long road the Court has taken to establish a mean-
ingful definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” is necessary to fully
understand the significance of the Court’s reasoning in Jones. Since the
Fourth Amendment itself does not explain what is a “search,” the Court
has attempted, since the nineteenth century, to provide guidance on this
issue. At least before Jones, the arc of this history has bent toward an ever
more sophisticated understanding of government incursion on privacy,
causing the Court to eventually recognize intrusions occurring without
physical invasion. The culmination of the Court’s efforts was the recogni-
tion that the Fourth Amendment could be implicated by an intrusion on
what a person could reasonably expect to be private, regardless of the lack
of tangible trespass.
A. Early Interpretations of a Fourth Amendment “Search”
Although the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791,8 the Su-
preme Court did not fully consider the right against unreasonable search
and seizure until 1886, in Boyd v. United States.9 In Boyd, a federal prosecu-
tor, seeking forfeiture of thirty-five cases of glass imported without pay-
ment of taxes, moved for the court to order the defendant to produce an
incriminating invoice for the glass.10 To assess the Fourth Amendment im-
plications of the government’s motion, the Boyd Court turned to Entick v.
Carrington, the same 1765 case that the Jones Court so lauded.11 In Entick,
Nathan Carrington and other messengers of the King, “with force and
arms,” broke into the plaintiff’s home.12 Without consent, the messengers
7. As will be noted, before Jones, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), the
Court refused to consider an officer’s subjective viewpoint in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
8. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 372 (Black, J., dissenting).
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10. Id. at 617–21.
11. See id. at 626; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
12. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 807; 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 275.
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remained for four hours, broke open “the doors to the rooms, the locks,
iron bars,” and “read over, pryed into, and examined all the private papers,
books, &c. of the plaintiff.”13 Carrying off “100 charts, 100 printed pam-
phlets, &c. &c.,” the messengers wrongfully exposed the plaintiff’s “secret
affairs.”14 Plaintiff’s counsel urged that giving officials such a power to
search would be equivalent to saying they had the “power to torture.”15
Believing the officials acted without proper authority, Lord Chief Justice
Camden noted, “[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred,
that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave;
if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will
tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.”16
Foreshadowing Jones, Boyd praised Entick as “one of the landmarks of
English liberty” that was “applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies
as well as in the mother country.”17 Boyd noted that Lord Camden in
Entick had emphasized, “[t]he great end for which men entered into soci-
ety was to secure their property.”18 Further, “every invasion of private
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass,” even if the only damage is
“bruising the grass.”19 Even business papers, as an owner’s “goods and
chattels,” were considered a person’s “dearest property.”20 While “the eye
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of trespass,” such an intrusion will
occur in physically removing the papers.21 Thus, in its early interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court anchored the right to the tangible
concepts of property and trespass.
Boyd then warned, “constitutional provisions for the security of per-
son and property should be liberally construed,”22 because “a close and
13. Id.
14. The Court specified, “whereby the secret affairs, &c. of the plaintiff became wrong-
fully discovered and made public.” Id.
15. Id. at 814; 2 Wils. K.B. at 285.
16. Id. at 817; 2 Wils. K.B. at 291.
17. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).
18. Id. at 627.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 627–28.
21. Id. at 628.
22. Id. at 635. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “liberal construction” in reference to stat-
utes as expanding:
the meaning of the statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or
reason of the law, or within the evil which it was designed to remedy, provided
such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the language used . . . . It means,
not that the words should be forced out of their natural meaning, but simply that
they should receive a fair and reasonable interpretation with respect to the objects
and purposes of the instrument.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 283 (5th ed. 1979).
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literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to grad-
ual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in sub-
stance.”23 Referring to the government’s illegal intrusion, the Court
famously warned: “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest
and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal modes of procedure.”24
Adherence to the visible and tangible made sense to Lord Camden in
1765 and even to our Founders while adopting the Fourth Amendment in
1791. The eighteenth century was a world that genuinely comprehended
only the concrete. At the time, physics had existed as a modern science for
just over a century after the printing of Isaac Newton’s Principia
Mathematica in 1687.25 While Europeans were first learning Newton’s
universal laws of gravity, American colonists, still bogged down in the
mysticism of the Middle Ages, held witch trials in 1692.26 Even by the
time of Boyd, science had not progressed sufficiently to enable scientists to
rely on unseen forces. In the late nineteenth century, an editor in the
Medical Record hesitated to embrace the germ theory, explaining, “Judging
the future by the past, we are likely to be as much ridiculed in the next
century for our blind belief in the power of unseen germs, as our forefa-
thers were for their faith in the influence of spirits, of certain planets and
the like, inducing certain maladies.”27 Therefore, the scientific knowledge,
or lack thereof, prevailing in the early history of our nation strongly rec-
ommended limiting decisions of practical consequence to what could be
known by reliance upon things actually felt and seen.
B. The Fourth Amendment “Search” as a Physical Trespass on a
Constitutionally Protected Area
The Court’s first Fourth Amendment cases stood on the firm foun-
dation of physical trespass. In Amos v. United States, a case in which the
defendant was convicted of concealing “whisky on which the revenue tax
had not been paid,” agents searching the defendant’s home found bottles
hidden in a barrel of peas and under a quilt on a bed.28 Since agents had
entered the home without a warrant, the Court had no trouble deeming
23. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
24. Id. Boyd is also known for its curious claim that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
share such an “intimate relation” that they “run almost into each other.” Id. at 630, 633.
25. See JOHN GRIBBIN, THE SCIENTISTS: A HISTORY OF SCIENCE TOLD THROUGH THE
LIVES OF ITS GREATEST INVENTORS 186 (2002).
26. See COTTON MATHER & INCREASE MATHER, THE WONDERS OF THE INVISIBLE
WORLD: BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRYALS OF SEVERAL WITCHES LATELY EXECUTED IN
NEW-ENGLAND, at v (London, John Russell Smith 1862).
27. CANDACE MILLARD, DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS, MEDICINE,
AND THE MURDER OF A PRESIDENT 157 (2011).
28. 255 U.S. 313, 314–15 (1921).
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their actions a violation of the Fourth Amendment.29 Amos offered the
Court a clear example of a Fourth Amendment search, for it involved an
actual physical entry by government agents into a house. The Court’s ini-
tial condemnations of Fourth Amendment intrusion involved the clearest
of violations—actual invasion of the home by a person representing the
State.
In Hester v. United States, another case involving the concealment of
“distilled spirits,” the Court once again focused on physical trespass, but
narrowed the scope of areas protected from government intrusion.30 In
Hester, revenue agents hid themselves at least fifty yards from the house
where Hester lived and saw him hand a quart bottle to another person
named Henderson.31 When Hester was alerted to the officers’ presence, he
ran, dropping a jug he was holding, which “broke but kept about a quart
of its contents.”32 Police picked up the jug, the bottle which Henderson
had discarded, and a jar thrown from a window of the home, all of which
contained moonshine whiskey.33 Even though officers recovered all the
objects when outside of the home, they acted without a warrant and one
officer admitted that “he supposed they were on Hester’s land.”34 The
Court in Hester found no Fourth Amendment violation “even if there had
been a trespass.”35 Although Hester briefly considered the encounter in
terms of privacy by noting that the defendant’s own actions in abandoning
the jug disclosed its existence, the Court mainly anchored its reasoning to
29. Id. at 315. The Court readily rejected the government’s warrantless search due to the
Fourth Amendment’s long-held preference for warrants, as noted in Weeks v. United States:
The maxim that “every man’s house is his castle,” is made a part of our constitu-
tional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has
always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen. “Accordingly,” says
Lieber in his work on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 62, in speaking of the
English law in this respect, “no man’s house can be forcibly opened, or he or his
goods be carried away after it has thus been forced, except in cases of felony, and
then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and take great care lest he
commit a trespass. This principle is jealously insisted upon.” In Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1878), this court recognized the principle of protection as applica-
ble to letters and sealed packages in the mail, and held that consistently with this
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures such matter could only be opened and examined upon
warrants issued on oath or affirmation particularly describing the thing to be
seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own household.
232 U.S. 383, 390–91 (1914).
30. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
31. Id. at 58 (noting agents were positioned “from fifty to one hundred yards away” from
the home).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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the trespass that occurred in the case.36 The Court noted that the evidence
recovered was “not obtained by entry into the house.”37 The fact that
officials examined the evidence while on a citizen’s land was unavailing
because the Fourth Amendment’s “special protection” applied only to
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”38 The Fourth Amendment, quite
simply, did not extend to “the open fields.”39
Outside of the Fourth Amendment itself, the only authority Hester
cited in support of this ruling was Blackstone, an English commentator of
the eighteenth century.40 The passage Hester relied upon involved Black-
stone’s description of the particular elements of common-law burglary.41
Blackstone noted that burglary required that a break-in occur in “a man-
sion or dwelling house.”42 Breaking into a “distant barn” or “warehouse”
would not constitute burglary, because such structures were not “looked
upon as a man’s castle of defense.”43 If instead the break-in implicated a
barn, stable, or warehouse, which was “parcel of the mansion-house, and
within the same common fence, though not under the same roof or con-
tiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house pro-
tects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the
curtilage or homestall.”44 Blackstone did not himself define common-law
burglary, but cited Sir Edward Coke, who began his reports in the late
1500s.45 Thus Hester, a twentieth-century constitutional law case, based its
ruling on criminal law at least as old as the sixteenth century.
As early as the 1920s, the Court began to consider issues of electronic
surveillance. In these early cases, however, the Court continued to apply
the legal rules it originally created for tangible searches by physical entry of
homes. The Court’s first electronic surveillance case, Olmstead v. United
States, demonstrated this dynamic.46 Roy Olmstead, a bootlegger during
prohibition, was the “leading conspirator” in illegally importing, possess-
ing, and selling liquor in Washington State.47 Olmstead’s business, which
had aggregate annual sales exceeding $2 million, sold some two hundred
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 59.
39. Id.
40. Id. (“The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law. 4
Bl. Comm. 223, 225, 226.”).
41. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 n.3 (1987).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 225, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sub-
ject_menus/blackstone.asp.
46. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
47. Id. at 455–56.
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cases of liquor per day to customers who ordered by phone.48 To gather
evidence of the conspiracy, prohibition agents wiretapped conversations by
inserting small wires “along the ordinary telephone wires” from four
homes and the main office.49 Since officers placed taps in the office build-
ing’s basement and in phone lines “in the streets near the houses,” the
evidence was gathered “without trespass upon any property of the defend-
ants.”50 The evidence, which was gathered for many months, revealed not
only Olmstead’s bootlegging, but also illegal dealing with the Seattle
police.51
In considering whether the wiretaps were illegal, the Court in Olm-
stead noted that the Fourth Amendment “itself shows that the search is to
be of material things—the person, the house, his papers, or his effects.”52
Further, the particularity requirement presupposed a search or seizure of
tangible things, for “[t]he description of the warrant necessary to make
the proceeding lawful, is that it must specify the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized.”53 The case law indicated that the Fourth
Amendment is simply not violated “unless there has been an official search
and seizure of [defendant’s] person, or such a seizure of his papers or his
tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or
curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”54 Since agents used only
their “sense of hearing and that only,” and since they refrained from actu-
ally entering the defendant’s houses or offices, “[t]here was no search-
ing . . . [t]here was no seizure.”55 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment did
not forbid such electronic surveillance.56
In so ruling, Olmstead revealed the Court’s fear that expanding the
right against unreasonable search and seizure to include such nebulous
things as electronic traces of conversations could open up the Fourth
Amendment to limitless application.57 The Court noted that the tele-
phone, invented only fifty years earlier, extended communications to far
distant places.58 Olmstead declared, “The language of the Fourth Amend-
48. Id. at 456.
49. Id. at 456–57.
50. Id. at 457.
51. Id. at 471(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting the surveillance “extended over a period of
nearly five months,” resulting in a written record of “775 typewritten pages”).
52. Id. at 464 (majority opinion).
53. Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 466.
55. Id. at 464.
56. Id. The Olmstead case was decided five to four. Justice Frankfurter later characterized
Olmstead as a case in which “this Court, by the narrowest margin, refused to put wiretapping
beyond the constitutional pale where a fair construction of the Fourth Amendment should prop-
erly place it.” On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 759 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
57. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465–66.
58. Id. at 465.
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ment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reach-
ing to the whole world” because the wires “are not part of his house or
office any more than are the highways along which the are stretched.”59
The Court’s next electronic surveillance case, Goldman v. United
States, involved technology that had evolved beyond wiretaps.60 In
Goldman, federal agents investigating bankruptcy fraud entered a conspira-
tor’s office at night to install a listening device.61 When that device failed
to work, the agents instead simply placed a “detectaphone” against a wall
enabling them to overhear the conversations from the next office.62 When
the conspirators later claimed the electronic eavesdropping violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Goldman Court first considered whether the
agent’s physical trespass to install the original faulty listening apparatus
tainted the later use of the detectaphone.63 Goldman held that the earlier
illegal trespass did not cause the later use of a different device to violate the
Fourth Amendment because “the trespass did not aid materially in the use
of the detectaphone.”64 In assessing the separate issue of whether the de-
tectaphone itself violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court rejected an
argument by the defendants that anticipated the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” analysis later created in Katz v. United States.65 The defendants
had contended that Olmstead, being a wiretapping case, was distinguishable
from the use of a detectaphone because a person speaking on a phone
“projects his voice beyond the confines of his home or office” and there-
fore assumes a risk that his “message may be intercepted.”66 In contrast,
the detectaphone picked up conversation from persons who expected their
conversations to “be confined within the four walls of the room.”67 Find-
ing defendants’ reasoning “too nice for practical application,” the Court
found the use of the detectaphone lawful under Olmstead.68 Thus, when
offered a chance to move beyond the materiality of the physical invasion
test, the Goldman Court explicitly refused because such an option would
open the Court to difficult line-drawing decisions.69
The Court once again refused to venture into fine legal distinctions
in On Lee v. United States, a case in which a “stool pigeon” was “wired for
59. Id.
60. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
61. Id. at 131.
62. Id. at 131–32.
63. Id. at 132, 134.
64. Id. at 135.
65. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
66. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 135.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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sound.”70 In On Lee, an old acquaintance entered defendant’s laundry and
prompted him to make incriminating statements.71 Since the acquaintance
wore “a small microphone in his inside overcoat pocket and a small an-
tenna running along his arm,” a Bureau of Narcotics agent overheard
statements that led to On Lee’s being charged with conspiracy to sell
opium.72 On Lee contended that the wired acquaintance violated the
Fourth Amendment by entering with consent obtained only through the
fraud of hiding the microphone, for the defendant would not have con-
sented to entry had he known of the presence of the device.73 The Court
happily avoided any “niceties of tort law” and “fine–spun doctrines” by
simply noting that there was no nonconsensual “physical entry” by force
or unwilling submission,74 and so “no trespass was committed.”75 Moreo-
ver, the On Lee Court refused to apply cases involving unlawful seizures of
tangible property to electronic surveillance, deeming it “farfetched” to
liken a traditional search or seizure to eavesdropping on a conversation.76
Any eavesdropping here was the fault of the defendant himself, who indis-
creetly spoke with someone he should not have trusted.77 Thus, agents did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.78
The tangible nature of the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine
reached its logical extreme in Silverman v. United States, in which police
physically penetrated the headquarters of an illegal gambling operation.79
Police inserted a microphone attached to a foot-long spike through a party
wall until the “spike mike” came into contact with a heating duct in de-
fendant’s home, “converting the entire heating system into a conductor of
sound.”80 The device enabled police to overhear incriminating conversa-
tions on both floors of the house.81 The Silverman Court, considering the
Fourth Amendment implications of the spike mike, avoided the “large
questions” stemming from the “frightening paraphernalia which the
vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society,” be-
cause officers accomplished the eavesdropping in the case “by means of an
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied” by the de-
70. 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 748–49.
73. Id. at 751–52.
74. Id. at 752–53.
75. Id. at 751.
76. Id. at 753–54.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 754.
79. 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961).
80. Id. at 506–07.
81. Id. at 507.
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fendant.82 Such “physical intrusion” or “physical encroachment” into a
“constitutionally protected area” distinguished Silverman’s eavesdropping
from precedent, which had as a “vital factor” the “absence of a physical
invasion” of the home.83 The physical penetration offended the Silverman
Court for “[a]t the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion.”84 Silverman, offering a cramped view of
the Fourth Amendment, where a citizen exercised this right by hunkering
down in their bunker of a home, thus specified:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the
Constitution . . . . A sane, decent, civilized society must pro-
vide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some
insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is
a man’s castle.85
Perhaps conscious of the weakness of an argument hinging entirely
on the crossing of a physical boundary, the Silverman Court admitted that
the Court of Appeals had been “unwilling to believe that the respective
rights are to be measured in fractions of inches.”86 But, the Court re-
sponded that its decision was “based upon the reality of an actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area.”87 The Court might have sensed the
increasing arbitrariness of measuring rights against electronic intrusion by a
physical yardstick, for while it upheld its prior holding in Goldman, it de-
clined “to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch.”88
C. The Court Rejected the Physical Trespass Rule in Favor of Defining a
Fourth Amendment Search by Government Intrusion on a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The rule focusing on physical trespass reached its breaking point in
Katz v. United States, a case in which Federal Bureau of Investigation
82. Id. at 509.
83. Id. at 510. The Silverman Court continually relied on its distinction between eaves-
dropping involving an actual or physical intrusion and surveillance made without such invasions,
noting that Olmstead involved “no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants,” while the
conversations were gathered in Silverman by “usurping part of the [the defendant’s] house or
office.” Id. at 511. Further, Silverman noted, “[t]his Court has never held that a federal officer
may without a warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man’s office or home.”
Id. at 511–12.
84. Id. at 511.
85. Id. at 511 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. at 512.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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agents recorded a caller’s side of a phone conversation by attaching an elec-
tronic device “outside of the public telephone booth from which he
placed his calls.”89 Relying on the Court’s own precedent, the parties in
the case, as well as the Court of Appeals, analyzed the case in terms of a
physical entrance into, or a physical penetration of, a constitutionally pro-
tected area.90 However, the Court in Katz “declined to adopt this formu-
lation of the issues,” disparaging the physical intrusion test as a misleading
talismanic incantation.91 Instead, Katz declared, “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.”92 The Court did concede that, “[i]t is true
that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose
further Fourth Amendment inquiry,” but it deemed Olmstead’s and
Goldman’s underpinnings to have become so eroded that their trespass doc-
trine “can no longer be controlling.”93 Thus, Katz explicitly ruled, “the
reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or ab-
sence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”94
After dismantling its old doctrine, the Katz Court, casting about for a
new rule, began to focus on privacy expectations. The Court believed that
knowingly exposing something, even in the home or office, could cause a
loss of Fourth Amendment protection, while seeking to preserve privacy,
even in a public place, may still trigger Fourth Amendment protection.95
Katz declared that a person who enters a phone booth, “shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world,” and therefore, the government’s electronic eaves-
dropping violated “the privacy upon which he justifiably relied.”96 It fell
to Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, to craft the enduring definition of a
Fourth Amendment search: “My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable.”97
Justice Black vehemently dissented from Katz’s innovation. He criti-
cized the “ingenuity of language-stretching judges” that distorted the plain
meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s language in a misguided attempt to
89. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
90. See id. at 348–50.
91. Id. at 351.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 352–53.
94. Id. at 353.
95. Id. at 351.
96. Id. at 352–53.
97. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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“keep the Constitution up to date.”98 The Fourth Amendment was meant
to address the palpably violent physical intrusion of “breaking in, ran-
sacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing people’s per-
sonal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates.”99 Justice Black
could “see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be
constructed to apply to eavesdropping”100 because it “does not automati-
cally apply to evidence obtained by ‘hearing or sight.’”101 Just as Justice
Black preferred grounding rulings in “the meaning of words” rather than
on “philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy,” he
viewed the Fourth Amendment, in protecting “persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” as limited to “tan-
gible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched,
seized, or both.”102 Since an overheard conversation lacked this tangibility,
it could neither be searched nor seized under the Fourth Amendment.103
Further, the Amendment’s requirement that “persons or things to be
seized” be particularly described was not only meant to limit protection to
seizure of tangible items, but to objects already in existence so they could
be described.104 Describing a future conversation simply was impossible,
and thus overheard discussions were not things the Founders meant to be
covered by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.105
D. The Primacy of Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Definition of a
Fourth Amendment Search
Despite Justice Black’s objections, Justice Harlan’s formulation of
what constituted a Fourth Amendment search became the accepted stan-
dard for over four decades in a vast variety of cases. By 1979, the Court
declared that, “[i]n determining whether a particular form of govern-
ment-initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States.”106 More
broadly, the Court described the “question whether a person has a ‘consti-
tutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” as the “touch-
98. Id. at 366, 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 367.
100. Id. at 373.
101. Id. at 368–69. Justice Black explained, “My basic objection is twofold: (1) I do not
believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today’s decision,
and (2) I do not believe it is the proper role of the Court to rewrite the Amendment in order to
‘bring it into harmony with the times’ and thus reach a result that many people believe to be
desirable.” Id. at 364.
102. Id. at 365.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979), superseded by statute, Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
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stone” of Fourth Amendment analysis.107 After nearly two decades of
reliance on Katz, the Court stated unequivocally that a government intru-
sion into a particular area “cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation
unless the area is one in which there is a ‘constitutionally protected reason-
able expectation of privacy.’”108 Katz had thus become the standard for
determining what constituted a Fourth Amendment “search.”
Katz’s ascendancy, however, meant the demise of the previous test
focusing on physical invasion into a constitutionally protected area. In ex-
plicitly recognizing that it had “overruled Olmstead and Goldman,” the
Court declared that Katz “finally swept away doctrines that electronic
eavesdropping is permissible under the Fourth Amendment unless physical
invasion of a constitutionally protected area produced the challenged evi-
dence.”109 As early as 1978, the Court deemed Olmstead to be repudiated
because Fourth Amendment protection turned on privacy expectations
rather than on “a property right in the invaded place.”110 Since the Fourth
Amendment’s “essential purpose” was to “shield the citizen from unwar-
ranted intrusions into privacy,”111 this right applied “as much to the citi-
zen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to
dispose of his secret affairs.”112
E. The Court Refined Katz’s Test by Determining that Individual Actions
Can Impact One’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Unlike the Court’s previous reliance on the physical trespass test,
Katz’s emphasis on privacy often caused Fourth Amendment application
to turn on an individual’s own actions. Knowingly exposing one’s posses-
sions to the public could undermine one’s Fourth Amendment protec-
tion—even in the home—while exercising discretion could extend
privacy into public places.113 Such reasoning had far-reaching conse-
quences, as illustrated by United States v. Miller, where the Court applied
Katz to banking records, which included financial statements, checks, and
107. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). The Court repeated its characteri-
zation of Katz’s focus on privacy as its “touchstone” in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591
(1974).
108. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986).
109. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971).
110. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
280 (1983), the Court again declared, “the Court overruled Olmstead saying that the Fourth
Amendment’s reach ‘cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.’” In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968), the Court determined that
the crucial metric was not title or property rights in the invaded place, but the “reasonable
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.” Finally, in Cardwell, the Court reiterated,
“[r]ather than property rights, the primary object of the Fourth Amendment was determined to
be the protection of privacy.” 417 U.S. at 589.
111. Cardwell, 417 U.S at 589.
112. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
113. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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deposit slips.114 Miller reasoned that since the defendant voluntarily con-
veyed his financial information to the banks and its employees in the ordi-
nary course of business, he ran the risk that, “in revealing his affairs to
another,” those employees might share such information with the govern-
ment.115 Therefore, the depositor’s Fourth Amendment interests were not
implicated by the government’s subpoena of such records.116 The Court
relied on Miller to rule in Smith v. Maryland that the use of a pen register to
collect the numbers dialed from a phone implicated no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because the caller “voluntarily conveyed numerical infor-
mation to the phone company” when placing the call.117
The doctrine of undermining one’s own privacy expectations by
conveying information to a third person took on a life of its own. In Couch
v. United States, the Court determined that a client providing an account-
ant with tax records could not claim Fourth Amendment privacy because
“there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the informa-
tion therein is required in an income tax return.”118 Similarly, an em-
ployee arrested after a controlled buy at an adult bookstore could not
reasonably expect privacy “in areas of the store where the public was in-
vited to enter and to transact business.”119 The defendant’s own actions, in
exposing his wares “to all who frequent the place of business” prevented
police examination of the materials from constituting a Fourth Amend-
ment search.120 In California v. Greenwood, the Court applied the same
standard to persons who placed trash on the curb for collection, for “hav-
ing deposited their garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspec-
tion, and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express
purpose of having strangers take it” destroyed the reasonableness of any
privacy expectations, and hence any Fourth Amendment claim of a
search.121 The Court’s logic in Miller reached its extreme, however, in
United States v. Dionisio, where a defendant claimed that a grand jury’s
receipt of recordings of his voice violated the Fourth Amendment.122 In
114. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
115. Id. at 443.
116. Id.
117. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). A pen register is a device that employ-
ees of a phone company can install that records the numbers dialed from one phone to another.
Id. at 737. Since it only discloses the numbers dialed, “neither the purport of any communica-
tion between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was
even completed is disclosed by pen registers.” Id. at 741.
118. 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
119. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).
120. Id.
121. 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
122. 410 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1973). In Dionisio, a special grand jury convened to investigate illegal
gambling had received voice recordings lawfully obtained by court order. Id. at 2. The grand jury
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Dionisio, the defendant refused to read a transcript into a recorder to pro-
vide a voice exemplar for purposes of identification.123 The Court found
that the Fourth Amendment provided no protection against the grand
jury’s hearing the recordings because the defendant knowingly exposed his
voice whenever he spoke to others.124 Since the “physical characteristics of
a person’s voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of specific
conversation, are constantly exposed to the public,” no one could have “a
reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice,
any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to
the world.”125
Katz’s standard required vigilance not only from one’s own exposure
of secrets, but from revelations by others as well. In United States v. White,
the Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment applied to conver-
sations between the defendant and a government informant, who wore a
radio transmitter.126 Agents monitoring the informant’s radio overheard
conversations the defendant and the informant had in various places, in-
cluding defendant’s own home.127 The White Court found no Fourth
Amendment protection because the defendant’s expectation that his
coconspirator would keep their conversations secret was not justifiable.128
Since there is no honor among the guilty, one contemplating criminal
activity must assume the risk that his companions may be reporting to, or
even recording conversations for, the police.129
A person’s reasonable expectation of privacy could even be frustrated
unintentionally. In United States v. Jacobsen, a private freight carrier acci-
dentally ripped open a package with a forklift and found it filled with bags
of white powder.130 The carrier alerted the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration, whose agent reexamined the contents of the opened package.131
The Court concluded that this reexamination was not a Fourth Amend-
ment search because it “infringed on no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.”132 Once a non-governmental third party frustrates the original
subpoenaed Dionisio to provide a voice exemplar for comparison with the lawfully recorded
conversations already received in evidence. Id. at 3. He refused, arguing, in part, that compelling
such exemplars would violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id.
126. 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971).
127. Id. at 747.
128. Id. at 752.
129. Id.
130. 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
131. Id. at 111, 119.
132. Id. at 120.
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privacy expectation,133 “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit gov-
ernmental use of the now nonprivate information.”134 Thus, third parties
could reduce the scope of our Fourth Amendment rights simply by mak-
ing freely available items for government inspection.135 These third parties
could be neighboring snoops, scavenging homeless, tabloid reporters, or
coupon clippers, all rummaging through trash left on the curb.136 Indeed,
those who diminish Fourth Amendment privacy need not even be human,
for dogs have destroyed a person’s Constitutional rights by dragging trash
into a neighbor’s yard “at the behest of no one.”137
F. The Court Altered Katz’s Standard by Considering the Identity
of the Object of the Government Intrusion
Katz’s focus on reasonable expectations of privacy also caused the
Court to focus on the identity of the object claimed to be private. If the
item in question was contraband, then the Fourth Amendment might not
protect against government intrusions to detect it.138 Such a distinction
relied on the Court’s shift from protecting people’s “reasonable” expecta-
tions of privacy to protecting their “legitimate” expectations of privacy.139
In United States v. Place, the Court found a trained canine’s sniff of luggage
in public “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment” because it exposed “only the presence or absence of narcot-
ics, a contraband item.”140 No “noncontraband items” risked being re-
vealed, so no legitimate privacy interests were implicated.141
The Court applied similar reasoning when it assessed the govern-
ment’s chemical testing of the white powder agents found in Jacobsen.142 In
Jacobsen, when presented with a package of white powder by the freight
133. Id. at 111 (noting specifically that “the law permits the frustration of actual expecta-
tions of privacy by permitting authorities to use the testimony of those associates who for one
reason or another have determined to turn to the police.”).
134. Id. at 117 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use infor-
mation with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”).
135. Id. at 119.
136. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 nn.3–4 (1988).
137. Id. at 40 n.2.
138. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (“Given the fact that seizures of
property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally
intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing government interests will
justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property contains contraband or
evidence of a crime.”); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 (“Congress has decided . . . to treat the interest
in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate
privacy interest.”).
139. See Place, 464 U.S. at 706–07; Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
140. Place, 464 U.S. at 707.
141. Id.
142. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
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carrier, the government agent immediately field-tested the substance, de-
termining that it was cocaine.143 Since the government test merely dis-
closed whether the substance was contraband without exposing any other
“arguably ‘private’ fact,” it compromised “no legitimate privacy inter-
est.”144 The agent’s test was therefore not a Fourth Amendment search.145
The Court has treated government intrusions seeking contraband
quite differently when the methods used could also expose lawful activity,
however. In Kyllo v. United States, an agent suspecting a homeowner of
growing marijuana at home used a thermal imager to determine whether
heat emanating from the house was consistent with the use of high-inten-
sity lamps typically employed in marijuana cultivation.146 While sitting in
his car, the agent detected heat emanating from the garage and sidewall of
the home, which ultimately led to the recovery of over one hundred mari-
juana plants.147 Kyllo deemed the information gathered by the imager to be
the product of a search, despite the fact that its focus was contraband.148
The Court was troubled by the imager’s potential to gather other informa-
tion besides the existence of contraband, noting that the camera “might
disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes
her daily sauna and bath—a detail many would consider ‘intimate.’”149
Lacking the ability of a canine sniff or a field-test to hone in solely on
contraband, the thermal imager could not operate without triggering a
Fourth Amendment search. Thus, a Katz search could be triggered by an
intrusion insufficiently tailored to detect only illegality.
G. The Court Added a New Factor to Katz by Considering Whether the
Technology the Government Employed in its Intrusion was
Generally Available to the Public
The Court has long noted the privacy implications of advancing
technology. As early as 1967, in Berger v. New York, the Court traced elec-
tronic eavesdropping back to interception of telegraph messages.150 When
it first applied Katz’s standard to various technologies, the Court assessed
these technologies with appropriate concern. In Katz itself, the Court
worried about technology eroding the common sense belief that a caller
143. Id. at 112.
144. Id. at 123 (“Congress has decided—and there is no question about its power to do
so—to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as illegitimate.”).
145. Id. at 124.
146. 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
147. Id. at 30.
148. Id. at 34–35.
149. Id. at 38.
150. 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967).
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from a phone booth should be “entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”151
The Court, however, recognized that not every technology impli-
cated Fourth Amendment privacy. For example, it found no Fourth
Amendment interests implicated by the use of pen registers, which re-
corded only the numbers dialed from a phone,152 or the shining of a flash-
light into the interior of a stopped car.153 In United States v. Knotts,
government use of an electronic beeper to track a car as it moved on public
highways did not cause Fourth Amendment application because,
“[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from aug-
menting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such en-
hancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”154
Similarly, “naked-eye observations” of a home’s curtilage155 from flyovers
of planes or helicopters in “navigable airspace” implicated no reasonable
privacy expectations.156
As technology advanced, however, the Court’s Fourth Amendment
concerns rose. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court confronted
government use of a “floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping camera” to
investigate a chemical manufacturing facility.157 The Court held that tak-
ing precision aerial photographs from a plane in navigable airspace did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search.158 The Court did acknowledge,
however, that use of “highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not gen-
151. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
152. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
153. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (holding that the shining of a flashlight
to illuminate the interior of a vehicle “trenched upon no right secured . . . by the Fourth
Amendment.”).
154. 460 U.S. 276, 281–82, 285 (1983).
155. The Court has described “curtilage” as “the land immediately surrounding and asso-
ciated with the home.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). The Court has ruled
that curtilage “warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home” because
“the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a
man’s home and the privacies of life.’” Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). Curtilage has become so important that the Court has developed a four-factor test
defining it:
[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference
to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the na-
ture of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to
protect the area from observation by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
156. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (helicopters); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (planes).
157. 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
158. Id. at 239.
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erally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be consti-
tutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”159 Dow Chemical predicted that a
more advanced device, which enabled the government to learn what was
happening behind walls or windows “would raise very different and far
more serious questions.”160 When such technology appeared in Kyllo, the
Court drew a line, deeming thermal imaging of a home to be a search.161
Kyllo declared, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology.”162 Fearing that the homeowner would be
“at the mercy of advancing technology,”163 the Court held that using
“sense-enhancing technology” to obtain information about the “interior
of the home” amounted to a search, “at least where (as here) the technol-
ogy in question is not in general public use.”164
Application of Katz to emerging technology is perhaps becoming
increasingly difficult for the Court. In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court
was presented with a government audit of “alphanumeric pagers” provided
to SWAT team members to use in mobilizing in emergency situations.165
Concerned about “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication
and information transmission,” the Court warned that “[t]he judiciary
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications
of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”166
Quon, therefore, avoided analyzing the privacy issues raised by pagers by
assuming without deciding that the Fourth Amendment applied to such
communications.167 The Court therefore has received criticism for failing
to assess the Fourth Amendment implications of pagers, “a technology
whose use had peaked in the 1990s and was largely replaced by mobile
phone text messaging long before 2010.”168
H. When the Court has Previously Applied Katz to the Tracking of
Automobiles in Public, it has Found No Fourth Amendment Search
Jones is far from the first case in which the Court has addressed the
Fourth Amendment implications of government intrusions on automo-
biles. In Cardwell v. Lewis, the Court employed Katz in deciding that “the
159. Id. at 238.
160. Id. at 239.
161. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
162. Id. at 33–34.
163. Id. at 35.
164. Id. at 34.
165. 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2625–26 (2010).
166. Id. at 2629.
167. Id. at 2630.
168. Karson Thompson, Luddites No Longer: Adopting the Technology Tutorial at the Supreme
Court, 91 TEX. L. REV. 199, 206 (2012).
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examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from
the exterior of the vehicle left in a public parking lot” infringed on no
expectation of privacy.169 The Court, in considering the privacy rights of
a driver stopped at a license checkpoint in Brown v. Texas,170 found “no
legitimate expectation of privacy” from an officer bending down and ad-
justing his angle of vision so he could see what was inside a stopped car.171
In Knotts, where the government used a tracking device to follow a car to
an amphetamine lab, the Court characterized the intrusion as amounting
“principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and high-
ways.”172 Recognizing that a person has lessened privacy in a motor vehi-
cle because the driver has little chance to escape public scrutiny, Knotts
concluded that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thor-
oughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another.”173 Any motorist should know that whenever he is
traveling on public streets, “he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his
final destination when he exited from public roads onto private prop-
erty.”174 The Court has therefore found in Katz little protection for driv-
ers on the street.
I. The Significant Variety of Circumstances to Which the Court has Applied
Katz Showed the Dominance of its Privacy Standard
For nearly a half-century, Katz’s privacy expectation test has defined
what is a Fourth Amendment search. This rule has stood unchallenged in a
whole host of cases of striking variety. The Court has employed Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy standard to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment applied as a “search” to the tactile squeezing of soft
luggage in the overhead bin of a bus,175 to an officer’s viewing of a dash-
board VIN number,176 and to an employer’s intruding into a doctor’s of-
169. 417 U.S. at 583, 591 (1974). Cardwell reiterated that “[r]ather than property rights,
the primary object of the Fourth Amendment was determined to be the protection of privacy.”
Id. at 589.
170. 460 U.S. 730, 733 (1983).
171. Id. at 740.
172. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 281–82.
175. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (holding that physical ma-
nipulation of a bus passenger’s carry-on luggage constitutes a Fourth Amendment search).
176. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (holding that an officer’s viewing of
a dashboard VIN number does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search).
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fice in a state hospital.177 Katz has been relied upon to assess intrusions
into tax records,178 into trash,179 and upon places as diverse as barns,180
adult bookstores,181 burned buildings,182 and prison cells.183
As a consequence, the Court has recognized as a given the resulting
“decoup(ling)” of the Fourth Amendment from trespassory violation of
property rights.184 Instead of simply looking for a physical intrusion, the
Court, in applying Katz, has considered a variety of factors in assessing the
reasonableness of a privacy expectation. The Court has given weight to the
intention of the Framers, the uses to which a location has been put, and
societal understandings.185 When the Court did bother to imagine a situa-
tion when “Katz’s two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate in-
dex of Fourth Amendment protection,” it had to resort to extreme
situations, such as “if the Government were suddenly to announce on na-
tionwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrant-
less entry.”186 Thus, on the eve of the Jones case, a Fourth Amendment
search was whatever Katz said it was.
II. UNITED STATES V. JONES
A. Facts
In 2004, a joint Safe Streets Task Force of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Metropolitan Police Department began investi-
gating Antoine Jones,187 an owner and operator of a nightclub in Washing-
177. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (holding that public employers’
searches of employee offices should be judged by reasonableness standard and do not require
warrants).
178. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (finding no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in tax records provided to accountant).
179. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (finding no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in garbage left outside on the curb for collection).
180. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 298 (1987) (holding that illuminating with
a flashlight a barn not within the curtilage of a home is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment).
181. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (holding that police officer’s enter-
ing into an adult bookstore and examining materials available to all store clientele did not consti-
tute a search).
182. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (holding that a criminal warrant is
required to search a burned building for evidence of criminal activity).
183. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524–25 (1984) (finding no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in prison cells).
184. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
185. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 715 (1987).
186. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
187. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948; Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 2, United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259) [hereinafter Appellant-Petitioner’s Brief].
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ton D.C., whom was suspected of trafficking cocaine.188 Hoping to link
Jones to coconspirators as well as locate any stash locations for illegal
drugs,189 the task force employed a variety of investigative techniques, “in-
cluding visual surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a camera fo-
cused on the front door of the club, and a pen register and wiretap
covering Jones’s cellular phone.”190 The investigators also used informants
who knew Jones and obtained warrants to review text messages between
Jones and other suspects.191
On September 16, 2005,192 the task force obtained a search warrant
enabling it to install a GPS tracking device on the Jeep Grand Cherokee
registered to Jones’s wife, although driven primarily by Jones himself.193
Even though the district court authorized the government to install the
device in the District of Columbia within ten days, the task force attached
the GPS tracker on the eleventh day, outside the District in Maryland.194
After placing the GPS device on the undercarriage of the Jeep, law en-
forcement received updates every ten seconds that could locate Jones’s ve-
hicle within fifty to one hundred feet.195 The GPS tracking device
automatically communicated with orbiting satellites, transmitting data to
“remote law enforcement computers in real time” and storing the infor-
mation for later use.196 For the following twenty-eight days, the device
recorded every movement of Jones’s vehicle, including speed and current
locations.197 “When the Jeep was not moving, the GPS device went into
‘sleep mode’ to conserve its battery, thus providing police with informa-
tion even when the vehicle remained in place.”198 Despite this energy-
saving feature, the task force used the device for so long that it once had to
change the battery as the vehicle was parked in a Maryland parking lot.199
The government, making no effort to minimize intrusion when the vehi-
cle was driven by other family members or left in the enclosed garage,
collected over two thousand pages of GPS data.200 The device, however,
188. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948; Appellant-Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 187, at 2.
189. Appellant-Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 187, at 2.
190. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
191. See United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (2006).
192. Id. at 87.
193. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
194. Id. See also Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 5, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259)
[hereinafter Appellee-Respondent’s Brief] (noting that since the government failed to execute
the warrant within its terms regarding time and place, the warrant became invalid).
195. Appellee-Respondent’s Brief, supra note 194, at 4.
196. Id. at 3–4.
197. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948; Appellee-Respondent’s Brief, supra note 194, at 4.
198. Appellee-Respondent’s Brief, supra note 194, at 4.
199. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
200. Appellee-Respondent’s Brief, supra note 194, at 4.
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“[did] not reveal who [was] driving the car [or] what the driver and
occupants were doing” or with whom they met at their destinations.”201
The GPS device tracked Jones’s Jeep to the “vicinity of a suspected
stash house in Fort Washington, Maryland.”202 Jones’s presence at the stash
house was confirmed by videotape and photographic evidence of him
driving his vehicle to and from the location.203 Learning from intercepted
calls that Jones was expecting a “sizable shipment of cocaine,” the task
force “executed warrants at various locations” on October 24, 2005.204
The search at the Fort Maryland stash house revealed “97 kilograms of
cocaine, 3 kilograms of crack cocaine,” and over $800,000 in cash.205 The
task force recovered $70,000 in the Jeep Jones had been driving.206
A federal grand jury charged Jones and others207 with conspiracy to
distribute and possession with the intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base.208 The indict-
ment alleged that Jones and his coconspirators “acquired, repackaged,
stored, processed, sold, and redistributed large quantities of cocaine and
cocaine base, in the District of Columbia, the States of Maryland and
Texas, the Republic of Mexico and elsewhere.”209 The indictment also
alleged Jones was the “primary supplier” to conspirators in the District of
Columbia and Maryland.210 Jones unsuccessfully moved to suppress the
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, and he was ultimately convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment.211
B. The Court’s Opinion
Justice Scalia, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Jones, signaled the
direction of the entire opinion in his first sentence framing the issue: “We
decide whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS)
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that de-
vice to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”212 By
narrowing the focus to the physical placement of a government object and
201. Appellant-Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 187, at 10.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (2006).
206. Id. at 77.
207. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (noting Jones worked with “several
alleged co-conspirators”).
208. Id.; Appellant-Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 187, at 5.
209. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 73–74.
210. Id. at 74.
211. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49.
212. Id. at 948.
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subsequent monitoring, the Jones Court anchored its analysis to material
and tangible concepts. Justice Scalia emphasized, “It is important to be
clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occu-
pied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”213 Jones’s
spotlight is thus on the actual occupation of a piece of private property by
the government. The Court addressed the tangible aspect of the task
force’s intrusion by declaring, “We have no doubt that such a physical
intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”214
The Court then specifically linked attaching the GPS device on the
Jeep to the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure by
noting that a vehicle amounted to an “effect” as listed in the Fourth
Amendment.215 An effect is clearly property, which comes with a well-
established history of rights. Jones therefore compared the use of GPS in
2005 with English law of 1765, Entick v. Carrington.216 Justice Scalia was
relieved to note that Entick “expressed in plain terms” the importance of
property rights to the analysis of search and seizure:
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no
man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his
leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at
all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify
it by law.217
Jones emphasized the Fourth Amendment’s “close connection to prop-
erty,” noting the Court had tied its jurisprudence “to common-law tres-
pass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”218
Justice Scalia described Katz’s privacy expectation test as a deviation
“from that exclusively property-based approach.”219 Jones aimed to return
Fourth Amendment law to its proper course because, “for most of our
history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular
concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers,
and effects’) it enumerates.”220 The Jones Court resurrected the standard
Katz had disparaged as “misleading”221 and “talismanic”222 by deeming
government acquisition of information by “physically intruding on a con-
213. Id. at 949.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 2 Wils. K.B. 275).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 950.
220. Id.
221. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
222. Id. at 352 n.9.
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stitutionally protected area”223 to be the “classic trespassory search.”224
Relying on physical intrusion enabled the Court to simply avoid the im-
plications of GPS monitoring under the Katz rule.225 Although it did not
need to employ Katz in the case, the Court emphasized that it was not
overturning this decades-old standard, but merely supplementing it. The
Court explicitly declared that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.”226
In applying its alternative to Katz, the Court in Jones concluded that,
in attaching the GPS device to the Jeep, “officers encroached on a pro-
tected area,”227 necessitating that the Court hold that “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device
to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”228 The Court,
therefore, resolved a troubling question about the implications of a newly
intrusive and ubiquitous technology by focusing on the fact that the gov-
ernment physically placed an item on a car.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF JONES’S RETURN TO
PHYSICAL INTRUSIONS
A. Jones’s Exhumation of the Government’s Physical Intrusion or Trespass on
a Constitutionally Protected Area Test Saddled Courts with Two
Fourth Amendment Definitions of a “Search,”
Potentially Undermining the Katz Standard
The Court in Jones emphatically and repeatedly contended that it was
not ridding itself of Katz, but merely recognizing that two definitions of a
Fourth Amendment search existed all along: (1) Katz’s privacy expectation
test and (2) Olmstead’s physical trespass standard.229 Jones’s assertion be-
comes strained, however, when contrasted with the Court’s actual lan-
guage in Katz and it progeny. The Katz Court roughly treated Olmstead’s
223. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.3.
224. Id. at 954.
225. See id. at 950 (“The government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no
search occurred here, since Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the area of the
Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the Jeep on the
public roads, which were visible to all,” but “[w]e need not address the Government’s conten-
tions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”).
226. Id. at 952 (emphasis in original). The Court repeated, “We do not make trespass the
exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass
would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at 953 (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 952.
228. Id. at 949.
229. The Court literally emphasized this point by italicizing key language. Specifically, it
declared, “The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for,
the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 952 (emphasis in original). The Court declared it was
refusing to create an “exclusive” test. Id. at 953.
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physical penetration test by dismissing it as misleading and famously inton-
ing, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”230 The Court
declared flatly in Rakas v. Illinois that Olmstead was repudiated231 and went
even further in White, plainly deeming both Olmstead and Goldman “over-
ruled.”232 Smith, in characterizing Katz as “our lodestar,”233 and Oliver, in
labeling Katz as “the touchstone of (Fourth) Amendment analysis,” both
made the repudiated physical trespass test conspicuous in its absence.234
Finally, Justice Harlan, the author of the currently recognized form of the
Katz rule, himself viewed Katz as overruling the Olmstead rule235 and dis-
paraged Goldman as “bad physics as well as bad law.”236
By resurrecting Olmstead without addressing the Court’s previous
criticism of the prior emphasis on the physical invasion of property, Jones
created a lack of clarity that could undermine the Katz rule. Having two
definitions for such a crucial Fourth Amendment term as a “search” is at
minimum inelegant, leaving officers in each case having to determine
which rule a court will later decide guided their actions. More troubling,
the two rules offer competing views about what the Fourth Amendment is
actually supposed to protect, because Katz focuses on privacy while Olm-
stead on property.
In his dissent, Justice Black did not hesitate to contrast Katz’s innova-
tion with the rejected trespass standard. He declared that the nebulous pri-
vacy test simply lacked a textual basis because the phrase, “persons, houses,
papers, and effects,” along with the Amendment’s particularity require-
ment, connoted “tangible things with size, form, and weight” which were
actually physically capable of being searched or seized.237 Conversations
yet to be spoken could not be the subject of the particularity requirement
because they were not “already in existence” and thus subject to being
described.238 He regretted that Katz, in an effort to provide Fourth
Amendment protection for the spoken word, used language “in a com-
pletely artificial way.”239
Jones favored textual anchoring and, as the Court did in Olmstead,
focused on tangibility. The Court specifically linked Jones’s Jeep to the
Fourth Amendment by noting it was an “effect.”240 Jones framed its in-
230. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
231. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
232. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748–49 (1971).
233. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
234. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
235. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 n.* (Harlan, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 362.
237. Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 366.
240. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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quiry in terms of physical occupation or intrusion of private property.241
The Court focused on the actual attachment of a piece of hardware onto a
vehicle, viewing this act itself as the relevant intrusion because it was an
actual encroachment on a protected area.242 Justice Scalia lauded the
Court’s long adherence to a “property-based approach.”243 Jones’s refuge
in tangibility is even more troubling when the Court’s reticence to con-
front new technologies is considered. As previously noted, the Court hesi-
tated to rule on whether review of messages sent on alphanumeric pagers
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, warning that “prudence counsels
caution” against creating “far-reaching premises” about the privacy expec-
tations of employees using employer-provided pagers.244
The Jones Court has thus created an unstable situation where two
rules, each premised upon fundamentally differing judicial philosophies,
vie to define Fourth Amendment searches. Further, Jones’s rationales for
reanimating Olmstead promote the physical intrusion test at Katz’s expense.
The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment was firmly tied to tres-
pass for most our nation’s history.245 Justice Scalia declared that “Fourth
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation,” itself a
deviation from the Court’s own precedent.246 Katz’s privacy expectation
rule could thus have an uncertain future, particularly with a Court that
prides itself on adhering to the text of the Constitution.
Jones’s de-emphasis of Katz has already had practical consequences.
Chances are that when Antoine Jones learned that a task force had been
tracking him for four weeks,247 his most pressing concern was not that the
government had physically occupied a small space on the undercarriage of
his Jeep. In all likelihood, what caused most distress was the prospect of the
federal government focusing its vast resources, including multiple satellites
and government computers, to generate two thousand pages of data re-
cording every move he made in his car.248 This privacy intrusion is not
addressed by the Court, leaving the real possibility that if the government
had committed the same surveillance, yet somehow avoided physical intru-
sion, Knotts,249 left undisturbed by Jones, would have found no Fourth
Amendment application, and therefore no Constitutional protection,
241. Id.
242. Id. at 952.
243. Id. at 950.
244. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
245. 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law
trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”); Id. at 950 (“For most of our history
the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass
upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”).
246. Id. at 950.
247. Id. at 948.
248. Id.
249. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
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against this constant and intrusive invasion of a person’s right to be left
alone.250 Jones’s focus on the physical left unresolved the question of how a
driver’s individual behavior, in conveying information about the location,
direction, and speed of his car, could undermine his own privacy expecta-
tions against continuous GPS surveillance.251 Similarly, Jones’s avoidance of
Katz failed to provide guidance on another factor deemed relevant in the
reasonable privacy expectation analysis: the general availability to the pub-
lic of a particular technology.252 GPS, a technology that consumers,
whether with their phones, cars, or other devices, come into contact with
on a daily basis, is not merely available but ubiquitous. The Jones Court,
however, rushed to protect the driver from the government attaching a
device onto the exterior of his vehicle, an intrusion originally outside the
notice, and probably not among the primary concerns, of Jones himself.
The Jones Court apparently welcomed the Katz deviation253 as much
as the public enjoyed the introduction of “New Coke.” In April 1985, the
Coca-Cola Company committed “one of the most famous blunders in
marketing history” when it replaced its original flagship drink with the
sweeter tasting “New Coke.”254 Ten weeks after introducing New Coke,
in response to a consumer revolt which involved 1,500 calls a day to Coca-
Cola’s complaints hotline, hoarding of original Coke, and boycotts, the
250. Justice Brandeis noted:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure,
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
251. Such an issue stems from the Court’s examination of how individual sharing of infor-
mation impacts reasonable expectation of privacy, as discussed in Part I.E supra.
252. This issue stems from the Court’s discussion regarding a technology’s availability in
impacting privacy expectations, as discussed in Part I.G supra.
253. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (“As we explained, for most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the
areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates . . . Katz did not repudiate that under-
standing. ‘[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects
persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which
the Amendment extends to the home.’” (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180
(1969))).
254. Stephanie Clifford, Coca-Cola Deleting ‘Classic’ From Coke Label, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2009, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/business/media/31coke.
html?_r=0; see also Robert M. Schindler, The Real Lesson of New Coke: The Value of Focus Groups
for Predicting the Effects of Social Influence, 4.4 MARKETING RESEARCH 22 (1992).
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company brought the original formula back.255 To distinguish the original
drink from New Coke, cans and bottles of the traditional product were
labeled as “Classic.”256 Over the years, Coca-Cola quietly shrank the font
size of the “Classic” designation until it simply omitted it from its labels in
2009.257 In Jones, Justice Scalia might have been taking a page out of Coca-
Cola’s playbook. Seeing Katz as a mistaken detour from the proper path of
“most of our history” when the Court interpreted a Fourth Amendment
search as a physical trespass upon a protected area,258 he aimed to make a
course correction by bringing back the old formula. Such an intention is
betrayed by the Court’s choice of language; Justice Scalia referred to the
physical intrusion standard as the “classic trespassory search.”259
Jones’s retrenchment might actually have been long in the making.
The Court, although ever careful to remain explicitly within Katz’s pri-
vacy expectation framework, has become increasingly reliant upon draw-
ing a distinction between tangibly physical intrusions and investigations
avoiding physical trespass. As early as 1983, the Court in United States v.
Place favored a canine’s sniff of luggage because it did not require “opening
the luggage” and therefore was “much less intrusive than a typical
search.”260 In California v. Ciraolo, the Court noted that the over-flight of a
“fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home”261 took place “in a
physically nonintrusive manner,”262 while in Florida v. Riley, the Court
warned that the home and curtilage were not necessarily protected from
inspection involving no physical intrusion.263 In Dow v. United States, the
Court considered an “actual physical entry” onto a company’s property to
raise “significantly different questions” from a flyover.264 Finally, in Bond v.
United States, the Court again distinguished between intrusions that were
“only visual” and those that involved “tactile observation.”265 In each of
these cases, however, the Court took for granted that Katz and its progeny
provided the ruling standard.266 Jones, in resurrecting Olmstead’s physical
255. Clifford, supra note 254.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.
259. Id. at 954.
260. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
261. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
262. Id. at 213.
263. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
264. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986).
265. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000).
266. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 337 (“First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown that ‘he [sought] to
preserve [something] as private . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual’s expectation of
privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”) (citations omitted); Riley,
488 U.S. at 449 (“‘What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
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trespass test, made no similar assumption, thus fundamentally changing
what a “search” means.
B. In Reviving the Physical Intrusion Standard, Jones Injected a Subjective
Element into Fourth Amendment Analysis That is Inconsistent with
Much of Fourth Amendment Doctrine.
In Jones, Justice Scalia aimed to clarify precisely what the government
intended when it intruded on property by noting that agents made a physi-
cal occupation “for the purpose of obtaining information.”267 In reviving
Olmstead’s focus on trespass, the Court therefore explicitly added to this
traditional rule an element assessing the intent or motivation of the gov-
ernment official who is performing the intrusion. Jones specified, “Trespass
alone does not qualify,” but instead must be “conjoined with” an “attempt
to find something or to obtain information.”268 The trespass, here the “in-
stallation of the device,” alone did not trigger a Fourth Amendment search
without the key ingredient of intent “to obtain information.”269
Even more strikingly, Jones altered the Katz rule itself by adding in-
tent to obtain information as a necessary element, for the Court explicitly
stated: “A trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is
not alone a search, unless it is done to obtain information, and the ob-
taining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a
trespass or invasion of privacy.”270 If the Court genuinely meant what it
said, Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz requiring a government intru-
sion on a privacy expectation that is both actual and reasonable is no
longer an accurate description of a Fourth Amendment search.271 To com-
plete this definition, Jones would now attach the official purpose or intent
to “obtain information.”272
This added element would so alter the Katz definition of a search as
to potentially force a reconsideration of the last four decades of search pre-
cedent. Government agents could now exploit Jones’s additional intent re-
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’”) (concurring opinion) (citations
omitted); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (“Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?”); Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 236
(“Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the inte-
rior of its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to
observe.”); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983) (“The Fourth Amendment ‘pro-
tects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy.’”) (citations omitted).
267. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
268. Id. at 951 n.5. Jones also described a “search” as a “physical intrusion of a constitution-
ally protected area in order to obtain information.” Id. at 951 (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
272. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.2.
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quirement by designing searches based on motives other than the motive
to obtain information. With the aim of crime prevention rather than crim-
inal investigation, officials could claim the intent to simply deter rather
than prosecute criminal activity. Such a contention has great credence in
the Age of Terror, when victory can only genuinely be claimed when a
plot is foiled rather than when one is successfully prosecuted. Further, es-
tablished case law could be circumvented. For example, officers could end-
run Kyllo by arguing that they only meant to send a message of deterrence
against the manufacture of drugs when they pointed an infrared camera at
a home. The federal government could electronically trawl all banking and
other financial records, pushing beyond the limits of Miller by claiming
only to be deterring money laundering. Police departments could push
Ciraolo and Riley to the breaking point by arguing that continuous over-
flights of residential neighborhoods by planes, or even drones, could be
simply to deter all sorts of illegality rather than to collect evidence against
any one individual. This argument would be all the more credible with
drones, which can collect reams of data that would swamp analysts’ efforts
to review all the resulting information. The addition of an intent element
could thus have a wealth of unintended consequences.
Since Jones’s holding focused on the physical installation of a GPS
device on a vehicle,273 perhaps its remarks about Katz were merely harm-
less dicta. The intent ingredient, however, is part and parcel of the Court’s
retreading of Olmstead’s trespass test, and therefore could have uncertain
and even disturbing implications for government searches by physical in-
trusion. The problem created by Jones’s reliance on an officer’s intent in
defining a search is that it injects subjectivity into Fourth Amendment
analysis, an approach “repeatedly rejected” by the Court in the past.274
In Whren v. United States, the Court warned that “the subjective in-
tentions of the law enforcement officer are irrelevant in determining
whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment” because the
issue was “not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions.”275
Whren considered whether the Fourth Amendment was violated rather
than whether it applied in the first place.276 Still, the subjective inquiry for
the application issue should be considered “fundamentally inconsistent
with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence” because it is simply less
fair.277 The Court has recognized that it “has long taken the view that
‘evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objec-
tive standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the sub-
273. Id. at 949.
274. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
275. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
276. Id. at 808.
277. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011).
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jective state of mind of the officer.’”278 Probing an officer’s subjective
mental state burdens the Court with the difficult task of unraveling the
motives of an individual’s mind.279 The Court’s wariness of divining sub-
jective motivations is so profound that it has avoided making such “post
hoc findings at a suppression hearing” in an entirely distinct area of Con-
stitutional law, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.280 Therefore, aware of the subjective standard’s shortcomings, the
Court typically narrows its Fourth Amendment analysis to the effect of an
officer’s actions rather than his or her state of mind.281
In spite of these concerns, Jones has chosen to alter the threshold issue
of Fourth Amendment application by adding a subjectivity element to its
search definition. Jones has injected subjectivity into its analysis with little
explanation as to its use for future officers and courts. This innovation
could create confusion in search and seizure practice and litigation.
In a sense, it already has. The subjectivity problem in Jones’s rule
forced the Court to defend this novelty in a case that came down in the
2013 term, Florida v. Jardines.282 In Jardines, a trained canine handler, as
part of a Drug Enforcement Administration joint surveillance team, fol-
lowed up an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown at a home by
approaching the home’s front porch with a drug-detecting dog.283 When
the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, police obtained a warrant for the
home, which ultimately led to the discovery and seizure of several mari-
juana plants.284 This case presented the Court with the issue of “whether
using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the con-
tents of the home is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”285 Jardines held that the canine sniff of the home in this case did
indeed constitute a search.286
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, reached its con-
clusion by relying on the Jones rule that “[w]hen the Government obtains
information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects,
a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has un-
doubtedly occurred.”287 The officers made such a physical intrusion in
Jardines because they could only gather information by physically intruding
278. Id. (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990)).
279. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 405.
280. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
281. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000). The Court has also declared
that “the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131
S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).
282. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
283. Id. at 1413.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1417–18.
287. Id. at 1414 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on the home’s “curtilage” which, as previously noted, is the area immedi-
ately surrounding the house and which shares the same Fourth Amend-
ment protection provided the home itself.288
Since the investigation therefore “took place in a constitutionally
protected area,” the Court then inquired whether such an intrusion was
permitted by the homeowner or instead “accomplished though an unli-
censed physical intrusion.”289 While an implied license “typically permits
the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait
briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer)
leave,”290 there is no such invitation to have a police dog “explore the area
around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”291 In
describing the license offered to visitors by the homeowner, Jardines de-
clared that the “scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only
to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”292
The “purpose” reasoning had earlier caught the attention of the gov-
ernment, who relied on Whren in noting, “the subjective intent of the
officer is irrelevant.”293 Justice Scalia, finding himself confronted with the
subjectivity problem, attempted to distinguish Jardines and Jones from
Whren. In Whren, Justice Scalia contended that the Court merely held that
“a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that
the officer’s real reason for making the stop or search has nothing to do
with the validating reason.”294 In contrast, in Jardines, “the question before
the court is precisely whether the officer’s conduct was an objectively rea-
sonable search.”
Justice Scalia’s argument, however, was blind to the fact that walking
a dog up to the door of a home is, by itself, an objectively reasonable act.
As one of the dissents in Jardines noted:
[I]n the entire body of common-law decisions, the Court has
not found a single case holding that a visitor to the front door
of a home commits a trespass if the visitor is accompanied by a
dog on a leash. On the contrary, the common law allowed even
unleashed dogs to wander on private property without com-
mitting a trespass.295
Thus, like the officers in Whren, the dog handler in Jardines was performing
objectively reasonable conduct—walking a dog to the door—that should
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1415.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1416.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. (emphasis in original).
295. Id. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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not be “vitiated by the fact that the officer’s real reason” had nothing to do
with the outwardly objectively reasonable act of bringing a dog to an-
other’s door.296 Thus, try as it might, the Court could not distinguish its
subjective test in Jardines from what it prohibited in Whren. Divining an
officer’s intent requires a subjective inquiry whether the officer is stopping
a car in Whren, walking a dog to a porch in Jardines, or attaching a GPS
device to a car in Jones.
C. In Attempting to Distinguish Earlier Vehicle-Tracking Cases, Jones
Unwittingly Created a Significant Loophole in Fourth Amendment
Application Which Law Enforcement Could Exploit
The Jones Court practiced some curious parsing of the Fourth
Amendment, separating its analysis into distinct steps that might create a
loophole allowing officials to avoid the Amendment’s constraints.297 This
compartmentalized approach occurred while Jones court was distinguishing
one of the “beeper” car tracking cases, United States v. Karo, from the facts
in its own case.298 In Karo, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents, with the owner’s consent, placed an electronic tracking device,
known as a beeper, on a can of ether before the owner sold it to James
Karo.299 The Karo Court held that installation of the beeper on the can of
ether with the original owner’s consent was not a search.300 Therefore,
aiming to distinguish its facts from Karo, Jones noted that in Karo, “at the
time the beeper was installed the container belonged to a third party [the
ether owner and seller], and it did not come into possession of the defen-
dant [Karo] until later.”301 The Court explained:
Thus, the specific question we considered was whether the in-
stallation “with the consent of the original owner constitute[d] a
search or seizure . . . when the container is delivered to a buyer
having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper . . . We
held not . . . [T]he transfer of the container with the un-
monitored beeper inside did not convey any information and
296. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion).
297. Ironically, in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 n.5 (2012), Justice Scalia
himself criticized the artificiality that comes with parsing Fourth Amendment concepts. In re-
sponse to Justice Alito’s criticisms in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia showed some irrita-
tion with his critics’ segregation of legal concepts into discrete components. Scalia criticized
Justice Alito for pointing out that “if analyzed separately, neither the installation of the device
nor its use would constitute a Fourth Amendment search” by acidly agreeing, “of course not,”
before explaining that the trespass must be done “to obtain information.” Id.
298. Id. at 952.
299. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). Knowing that chemical smugglers
use ether to extract cocaine from clothing imported into the country, the DEA attached a beeper
to the can in hopes of following it to the cocaine. Id.
300. Id. at 712.
301. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
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thus did not invade Karo’s privacy . . . Karo accepted the
container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was therefore
not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it
was used to monitor the container’s location.302
Karo did not control Jones because, unlike James Karo, Antoine Jones
“possessed the Jeep at the time the Government trespassorily inserted the
information-gathering device,” and thus was “on much different foot-
ing.”303 The key difference was ownership of the vehicle when the gov-
ernment physically invaded it by attaching a device to it. So long as the
person being monitored did not own the property at the moment when
the physical trespass upon it occurred, a Fourth Amendment search was
not created by attachment of the device. This was true even though no
one informed the new owner that the government has previously planted a
tracking device on property he now owned; the duty of full disclosure
played no part in this analysis.
At minimum, the Jones Court’s reasoning fails to punish government
officials who adulterate products with secret additions meant only to bene-
fit the government. Officers who lie by omission will be in a stronger
position to have evidence admitted into court than those who honestly
disclose to purchasers that their items have an electronic passenger sending
information to the government. At worst, it encourages police to seek a
new loophole to Fourth Amendment protection. If the government
wished to avoid committing a Jones search, it need only attach the tracking
device, whether an old-fashioned beeper or a tracker employing the latest
GPS technology, on the vehicle before the customer’s purchase. The gov-
ernment could swamp dealerships with secret GPS devices for all vehicles
sold, without bothering to inform car purchasers of the physical intrusion.
The government could go one better and have the devices installed at the
factory while the car is being built. The installation-before-purchase gam-
bit need not be limited to vehicles, for the government could insert GPS
tracking into any product, be it jewelry, knickknacks, appliances, or gro-
ceries, before such items hit the shelves for sale. This loophole is so large
that it would enable the government to track cell phones, already equipped
with GPS technology before sold to the customer. Thus, while implying
that it was adding to Fourth Amendment protection,304 Jones might have
created a backdoor that government could exploit to severely limit our
privacy.
302. Id. (emphasis in original).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 951–52.
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CONCLUSION
When warning against the dangers of government wiretapping, Jus-
tice Brandeis quoted Chief Justice John Marshall in declaring that constitu-
tions were “designed to approach immortality as nearly as human
institutions can approach it.”305 Therefore, in interpreting a constitution,
“our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may
be.”306 Otherwise, a national charter’s general principals would be re-
duced to “impotent and lifeless formulas,” promising rights in words but
not in reality.307 He rejected making distinctions between the visible and
tangible on one hand and the invisible and intangible on the other.308 Jus-
tice Brandeis recognized, in 1928, a time when technological progress was
not nearly as rapid as it is today, that the “progress of science” would only
enhance government’s ability to intrude on individual privacy.309 He un-
derstood that the inventive mind would create “objects of which the
[founding] Fathers could not have dreamed.”310 Similarly, in his dissent-
ing opinion in Goldman v. United States, the case in which agents placed a
“detectaphone” on a wall to overhear conversations in the next room, Jus-
tice Murphy criticized the Court’s “narrow, literal construction of the
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment adopted in Olmstead,”
noting that such cramped reasoning paradoxically would protect “the most
mundane observations entrusted to the permanence of paper,” but fail to
safeguard thoughts “too intimate” to be written down.311
The Court, in Jones, has lost sight of these lessons. Justice Scalia
noted, “for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”312 This assertion missed
the point that, for that same time period of our history, technology simply
had not advanced to a state that could threaten our basic privacies in the
way it does today. Jones further urged that until as recently as the “latter
half of the 20th century,” the Court had tied the Fourth Amendment to
“common-law trespass.”313 This point fails to mention that the Court’s
abandonment of the common-law trespass rule was directly caused by new
305. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 475.
309. Id. at 474.
310. Id. at 472.
311. 316 U.S. 129, 141–42 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). In Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 13 (1985), the Court also warned that adherence to common-law rules in the face of
sweeping technological change could lead to “a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a
historical inquiry.”
312. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
313. Id. at 949.
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threats to privacy occasioned by advancing technology the founders could
not have foreseen.314
When the Fourth Amendment became Constitutional law, one of
the foremost scientists of the time, Benjamin Franklin, had recently intro-
duced the world to the electrical battery by connecting together a series of
Leyden jars.315 It is surmised that Franklin described the harnessing of the
ephemeral energy of electricity in tangible terms by coining the word
“battery” to liken a line of Leyden jars to the easily envisioned idea of a
row of cannons.316 Nearly a century after the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, American scientists scoffed that Joseph Lister’s argument
urging antisepsis as a means to combat invisible germs was “absurd.”317
The idea that everything on Earth is made of imponderably tiny particles
called atoms, themselves including even smaller “corpuscles” (electrons),
had to wait for the discoveries of J.J. Thomson and Ernest Rutherford at
the turn of the twentieth century.318 As thinkers of the Enlightenment, the
Founders relied on reasoned arguments based on what was known at the
time. Since the state of technology and science at the time of the Founders
did not expose them to intrusions beyond physical trespass, they had no
reason to make legal rules that would address the invisible and intangible.
Jones seemed to have forgotten that the intrusion the Katz Court
concerned itself with was the electronic interception of a conversation, not
the attachment of a device “to the outside of a public telephone booth.”319
Undue focus on the trespass rule of the past could prevent the Court from
meeting the goal Jones set for itself: “At bottom, we must ‘assure preserva-
tion of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.”320 Technological progress will not al-
low the Court to stand still. Jones might wish to focus on the intrusion
stemming from a physical attachment of a device to a car, but advances in
government surveillance techniques will continue despite the Court’s res-
olution to consider only the past. The larger issues of privacy invasion
caused by GPS and other increasingly intrusive technologies temporarily
dodged by Jones will have to be faced by the Court if the Fourth Amend-
ment is to maintain meaningful protection of privacy.
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